Frenetic Pony wrote:Again, the statistics don't matter. You are saying, essentially, over an infinite set, that a non impossible part of that set can't be in that set because it's too unlikely.

No, I'm not saying the math is wrong. Your conclusions are the perfectly correct output of the mathematical model you're using. I'm saying the math doesn't apply, somewhat like how one can't apply addition to adding one liter of water to one liter of vodka (less than two liters), except the point where the math doesn't stick is because of the assumptions we do science under.

Instead you're argue that it "can't happen" just because it's highly improbable.

I'm saying it can't happen because it's unmeasurable; or rather that unmeasurable things aren't worthy of consideration.

And you seem to assume that reverse of entryopy somehow breaks logic, which it simply doesn't.

It breaks induction, not deduction. From outside of a spontaneously entropy reversing universe we can still consider the odds of it happening and the implications of it doing so. We cannot do so from within because all of our mental processes are compromised.

If we were a mind not subject to this reverse entropy, but only observing this reverse entropy universe, we still couldn't determine the laws of nature accurately because every measurement is an extreme statistical artifact.

And remember, quantum randomness, which is the exact sort of statistical fluke you reject out of hand, doesn't "make sense" to us in an extremely similar fashion.

Statistics is collection multiple sample data points to make predictions about a larger population.

We are very large compared to quantum randomness. There's more than one electron and each one can be observed multiple times. We can meaningfully say tunneling happens as a statistical fluke because we've collected statistics on electrons. Statistics apply to the population of electrons.

We only get one universe (by definition). If we observe the universe as X, it's X. If we observe it as Y it's Y. Mathematically, we can say we observe it as X but it's probably Y under some

a priori model of physics, but if we're being empirical, we have to take the universe as it's presented to us.

You could very well say that on planet X all (insert intelligent organism pronoun here) with blue eyes always quantum tunnel through concrete whenever they try it, every time without fail, and you'd still not "break" the universe as we understand it.

That would not break the universe, but it would break our understanding of the universe. Science is the process of changing our understanding of the universe based on what we observe. Once an empiricist observes this regular tunneling process, they can no longer keep the standard model of physics.

The exact best new model is complicated, but there is now an inordinate amount of evidence a new model is needed. From outside the hypothetical we might be tempted to say "But that's not how the physics really works in this hypothetical universe, and a rational person should approach an understanding of their universe, not move away from it." But this scenario isn't really fair to our hypothetical scientist.

Let's stop and really think about how this hypothetical universe works. In general it's physics is like ours except for the blue-eyed-tunnelers. The blue eyed tunnelers are an inherent part of the hypothetical and therefore an inherent part of the hypothetical universe. The list of physical laws of that universe is our list of physical laws plus some special conditions for blue eyed tunnelers.

So our hypothetical scientist starts off thinking their universe follows a set of physical laws equivalent to our universe's. Then they see the blue eyed tunnelers and adjust their model of physics to compensate for the special case in the hypothetical universe's workings. We can't fault our scientist for moving away from using a model of physics the fits our universe towards one that better fits their universe.

The thing about recursion problems is that they tend to contain other recursion problems.