3. (K)illing other pirates
(LCK for short)
The pirates I've read about don't necessarily value their own life or coins very highly, it seems possible they may be more interested in killing other pirates, so I propose we switch up the orders, as a salute to https://xkcd.com/1613/.
The original puzzle (thanks to Poker/Wardaft) is here:
There are five pirates (in order, A, B, C, D, and E) dividing a treasure of 1000 gold. As before, the pirates will vote on pirate A's proposal first, followed if it fails by pirate B's, and so on, with the majority deciding, and the current proposer breaking any ties. All pirates first and foremost want to survive, and given that, want to get as much gold as possible (on average, if probabilities are involved), and given that, want to kill as many pirates as possible, and will never go against these priorities. If there are still two or more best options after those three criteria are considered, pirates will decide in an effectively random manner, beyond the realm of any possible deal-making or predictability on the part of the other pirates. Oh, and to close off a potential loophole, all of the facts in this paragraph are common knowledge between all pirates - and I mean the kind of infinitely-layered common knowledge that is not present in the Blue Eyes problem.
How will the gold get divided?
It seems we have 6 scenarios:
I'm interested in which proposal gets accepted, and what the breakdown is. I believe I have an answer to each and would like to validate them, but most importantly I quite enjoyed thinking about the chaos perfect-logicians-who-don't-value-their-own-lives can create, and wanted to share it.
(I didn't want to include the occasionally cited 4th priority tiebreaker of "randomness" as being anywhere but 4th, but for a bonus point (or 24), feel free)